DR. BRIAN RIBEIRO did his undergraduate work at Mississippi College, where he received a B.S. in psychology in 1996. Afterward, he went to Vanderbilt University to do his graduate work in philosophy (M.A., 1999; Ph.D., 2001). His dissertation, “Skepticism and Human Values,” defended a form of Cartesian skepticism and explored the value-theoretic implications of that radically skeptical position. Since 2001, Ribeiro has published on various aspects of the power and majesty of radical skepticism, in both its ancient and its modern forms. His current research is primarily focused on Hume and on Pyrrhonian skepticism, along with certain issues in what might be called epistemic psychology, most especially the set of questions related to the sense(s) in which we are—or are not—able to “take skepticism seriously” and be changed or transformed by skeptical insights.
Dr. Ribeiro has been teaching at UTC since 2004. In 2013 he was elected to membership
on the UTC Council of Scholars. In
2014 Dr. Ribeiro served as President of the Tennessee Philosophical Association (see http://www.tpaweb.org/presidents.html).
- “Epistemic Akrasia,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2011): 18-25.
- “Philosophy and Disagreement,” Crítica 43 (2011): 3-25.
- “The Problem of Heaven,” Ratio 24 (2011): 46-64.
- “Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Exercises in Skeptical Cartography,” Modern Schoolman 87 (2009): 7-34.
- "Hume’s Changing Views on the ‘Durability’ of Skepticism,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2009): 215-236.
- “Must the Radical Skeptic Be Intellectually Akratic?”, Facta Philosophica 8 (2006): 207-219.
- “Is Pyrrhonism Psychologically Possible?”, Ancient Philosophy 22 (2002): 319-331.
- “Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control,” The Monist 85 (2002): 468-477.
[N.B.: If you have exhausted the institutional resources available to you (electronic access, print access) and you were not able to obtain a copy of one of the papers above, you are invited to contact the author who will try to supply a copy for you.]